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COMMENT

International Asylum and Boat People: The
Tampa Affair and Australia‘s
―Pacific Solution‖
PETER D. FOX†
_______________________

I. INTRODUCTION
On August 26, 2001, the Norwegian cargo ship MV Tampa rescued
433 ―boat people‖1 from the distressed Indonesian fishing vessel
Palapa, off the coast of Christmas Island, Australia. The Australian
government summarily denied the passengers access to its territory.
The boat people were mostly refugees2 fleeing war-torn Afghanistan.
† Executive Notes Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2009–10;
J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, May 2010. The author wishes to
thank Sarah Winter, Adam Walkaden, and the staff of the Australian Law Reform
Commission for their inspiration.
1. The term ―boat people‖ originated in the 1970s to describe migrants fleeing
Vietnam. Investigators use it to describe refugees who, secretly and illegally, depart
their countries on overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels. Jacqueline Marie Hall, Sink
or Swim: The Deadly Consequences of People Smuggling, 12 IND. INT‘L & COMP.
L. REV. 365, 367 n.18 (2002) (citing Josh Briggs, Sur Place Refugee Status in the
Context of Vietnamese Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 433, 437
(1993)).
2. ―Refugees‖ are defined in Article I of the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art I, July 28,
1951, 189 U.S.T. 150, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
Refugees are persons who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion, are outside their country of nationality and unable or unwilling to seek
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They had sailed from western Indonesia with the help of hired human
traffickers, and Australia wanted them returned to their point of
embarkation. The result was a standoff at the edge of Australian
territorial waters.
After several days in the water, the asylum seekers3 persuaded the
Tampa’s Captain, Arne Rinnan, to attempt a landing in Australia. The
Australian government, led by Prime Minister John Howard, never
permitted the landing despite Rinnan‘s August 29, 2001 request for
urgent medical attention to a number of passengers. Instead, Australia
dispatched its Special Air Service (SAS) to intercept and seize the
Tampa after the ship disregarded radio warnings and entered
Australian territorial waters.4
The Australian government‘s hard-line stance during the Tampa
affair marked the dawn of a prolonged state policy aimed at deterring
future asylum seekers that held sway until a change in political
leadership in 2007. Though the Howard government‘s tough posture
drew world-wide condemnation, it galvanized the governing Liberal
Party of Australia to harden its stance on immigration in the midst of
a re-election campaign.5 The seized passengers were confined to the
Tampa and left on the sea for weeks. The events of September 11,
2001 soon overshadowed news of the standoff and the plight of the
refugees and ushered in a general climate of suspicion and
vulnerability in Australia.
Australia instituted significant, ad hoc border policy changes in
response to the Tampa incident that remained in place for years. The
Parliament pushed through a series of legislative enactments, now
protection from that country. Id.
3. ―Asylum‖—or ―political asylum‖—is defined as the ―[p]rotection of . . .
political refugees from arrest by a foreign jurisdiction; a nation or embassy that
affords such protection.‖ BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 121 (7th ed. 1999). Asylum
usually involves a country providing protection to refugees on its territory. At the
least, asylum means protection from ―refoulement,‖ the forced repatriation of
individuals to countries where their lives or freedoms are threatened. Asylum
seekers generally must meet the legal definition of a refugee to be afforded such
protection.
4. MV Tampa Captain Arne Rinnan was threatened with heavy human
trafficking penalties set out in the Migration Act, see infra note 7, if he disobeyed
Australia‘s order to not enter its territorial waters. The Tampa‘s chronology reads:
―Advised if the vessel enters Australian territorial waters it would be breaking the
migration law and will be subject to prosecution and fines up to A$110,000 and
jail.‖ DAVID MARR & MARIAN WILKINSON, DARK VICTORY 31 (2004).
5. See generally MARR & WILKINSON, supra note 4.
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known as the ―Pacific Solution,‖6 to avoid bringing the rescued
passengers ashore and triggering the machinery of the 1958
Australian Migration Act (Migration Act).7 Whereas in the past,
reaching Australian territory would have afforded the refugees the
opportunity to access Australian courts of law, under the Pacific
Solution, the territories of Christmas Island, Ashmore Reef, and the
Cocos Islands were excised from the purview of the Migration Act.
This legislative action denied refugees who reached outlying parts of
Australia the right to seek asylum. Further, the Pacific Solution
directed the Australian Navy to intercept and transport arriving boat
people to detention camps on small islands for formal processing and
detention.
Australia is party to a number of international conventions and
protocols designed to protect the rights of refugees and asylum
seekers. Foremost among these are the 1951 Convention and Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention),8 the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),9 the
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),10 and the 1984
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT).11 These conventions
are forms of agreement between nations that are binding in
international law. The role of international law, which governs the
relationships between countries, is to act as a referee for states that
voluntarily agree to adhere to customary principles of behavior that
are acceptable to the international community. Although no police
6. Australia‘s ―Pacific Solution‖ entailed the interminable displacement of
asylum seekers arriving by boat to various Pacific island detention facilities—
regardless of the legitimacy of their claims. See infra Part IV.
7. Migration Act (1958), No. 62 (Austl.) (amended 2008, No. 85) [hereinafter
Migration Act]. Section 4(1) states that: ―(1) The object of this Act is to regulate, in
the national interest, the coming into, and presence in, Australia of non-citizens.‖
Id. The Migration Act is the primary piece of legislation that incorporates into
domestic law Australia‘s obligations as a ratifying party to the 1951 United Nations
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. See infra note 25 and
accompanying text.
8. Refugee Convention, supra note 2.
9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
10. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CRC].
11. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85.
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force exists to punish countries which breach their international legal
obligations, the international community may choose to respond to
violations through sanctions or military intervention.12
In addition, the international community has agreed to customary
methods of interpretation of public international law. The
fundamental rule of treaty interpretation is expressed in Article 31 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna
Convention): ―A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.‖13
This Comment explores the Australian retreat from its international
treaty commitments during the Tampa affair through (1) the
introduction of applicable international agreements; (2) reflection on
the source and justification of government-asserted authority to
disregard its international obligations; and (3) an examination of legal
issues concerning interdiction of vessels at sea and the practice of
indefinite removal of persons to third countries. The Comment
contends that the rescued passengers of the Palapa were entitled to
seek asylum in Australia because they met the definition of a refugee
under the Refugee Convention.14 The Tampa proceedings revealed a
disturbing lack of justiciability of international norms in Australian
courts.
II. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND TREATIES APPLICABLE
ASYLUM SEEKERS ARRIVING BY BOAT

TO

The frequency of human trafficking to facilitate illegal
immigration into Western, democratic countries has risen sharply
since the 1990s.15 The United Nations High Commission for
12. AUSTRALIAN LAWYERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AUSTRALIAN LAWYERS FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS REFUGEE LAW KIT 2004 ch. 2 (2004), http://www.alhr.asn.au/refug
eekit/downloads/chapters_all.pdf [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS REFUGEE LAW KIT].
13. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331. States are further required to carry out their treaty obligations in good faith. Id.
art. 26 (―Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties and must be performed by
them in good faith.‖).
14. See infra notes 25–32 and accompanying text.
15. In the year 2000, more than 150 million international migrants lived outside
their countries, with more than half residing in developing countries.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, WORLD MIGRATION REPORT
2000 (Susan F. Martin ed., 2000), http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/cache/offonce/pid
/1674?entryId=7279. The smuggling of human migrants means ―the procurement,
in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the
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Refugees (UNHCR) expects this trend to continue, citing military
conflict, poverty, unemployment, and limited opportunities for legal
migration as key motivating factors for human trafficking, now a
worldwide, multi-billion-dollar industry.16 By the time the Tampa
arrived in Australia in 2001, the government was already deeply
committed to anti-human-trafficking efforts. Years of diplomatic
pressure had resulted in coordinated enforcement initiatives with
Indonesia, a well-known point of departure for undocumented
migrants arriving in Australia.17
A. Sea Rescue
Australia‘s obligations to refugees arriving by boat include the
granting of basic humanitarian assistance to vessels in distress, the
provision of due process rights, and the right to petition for asylum in
a court of law.18 Australia is party to the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which codified formal
international rules of sea rescue.19 Article 98 of UNCLOS pertains to
the duty to render assistance to persons and vessels in distress:
1. Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag,
in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the
crew or the passengers:
(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger
of being lost;
(b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of
persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in
illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a
permanent resident.‖ Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and
Air Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime art. 3, Nov. 15, 2000, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 [hereinafter Protocol
against the Smuggling of Migrants].
16. ADRIENNE MILLBANK, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA PARLIAMENTARY
LIBRARY, BOAT PEOPLE, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM SEEKERS: IN
PERSPECTIVE (1999), http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/19992000/2000cib13.htm.
17. Several hundred boat people had arrived in Australia each year since the
1970‘s but by 2001, the numbers had risen to several thousand. MARR &
WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 38. Australians saw arriving boat people as illegal
immigrants with no visas, and even as wealthy for making the journey with the help
of human traffickers. Id.
18. Migration Act, supra note 7. Immigration to Australia is controlled by the
Migration Act and its regulations. Id.
19. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3, 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him.‖20
Article 98 was incorporated into Australian domestic law as
Section 317A of the country‘s Navigation Act, enacted in 1912.21
Tampa Captain Arne Rinnan adhered to Article 98‘s guidelines
when he acknowledged the mayday of the Palapa and radioed to
advise Australian authorities of his boat‘s change of course to head
for the ―position of distress.‖22 As master of a passing cargo ship on
the high seas, Rinnan relied on the commitment of Australia to treat
boat people according to the international rules of sea rescue, as
codified in UNCLOS. More than two hours after Rinnan‘s radio
communication, Australian authorities continued to evade
responsibility for the sea rescue operation. Officials advised Rinnan
that ―Indonesian search and rescue authorities have accepted
coordination of this incident‖23 but did not provide Rinnan with any
indication of where he could land survivors.24
B. Treatment of Refugees
As a ratifying party to the Refugee Convention, 25 Australia bound
itself to conform to international law regarding the treatment of
arriving refugees. While the Refugee Convention is largely silent on
the procedural aspects of application for admission as a refugee, 26
Article 33 does prohibit the ―refoulement‖ of a refugee to the border
of a country where his ―life or freedom would be threatened.‖ This
section of the Refugee Convention states that ―[n]o Contracting State
20. Id. art. 98.
21. MARR & WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 21 n.9.
22. Id. at 18 n.1.
23. Documents provided under Freedom of Information legislation by the
Australian Maritime Safety Authority related to the Palapa rescue. MARR &
WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 19 n.2.
24. MARR & WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 22 n.10.
25. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. I. The treaty was ratified by
Australia on December 13, 1973, with the following reservation: ―The Government
of Australia will not extend the provisions of the Protocol to Papua/New Guinea.‖
Id. The 1967 Protocol provided a generic international refugee agreement,
removing a shortfall in the 1951 Convention where the definition of ―refugee‖ was
limited to those who had fled events in Europe occurring before January 1, 1951.
See Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 1. When Australia ratified the 1967
Protocol, it became derivatively bound by the 1951 Convention, obligating
Australia to respect all refugee rights under the 1951 Convention.
26. Nothing in the 1951 Convention requires any state to admit overseas
refugees. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY
926 (4th ed. 2005).
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shall expel or return (‗refouler‘) a refugee in any manner whatsoever
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion.‖27
In its general provisions, the Refugee Convention grants certain
rights to persons that meet the definition of a refugee. Chapter 2
grants ―Juridical Status‖ rights to refugees, including the Article 16
right to ―free access to the courts of law on the territory of all
Contracting States.‖28 The administrative measures guaranteed in
Chapter 5 include the Article 26 right to freedom of movement once
a refugee is lawfully within a Contracting State’s territory.29
Australia made certain that Article 26 could not be invoked when it
prevented the Tampa from landing the rescued asylum seekers on its
territory and concurrently denied them the Article 16 right to access
Australian courts.30
Perhaps one of the most important rights granted to refugees under
the Refugee Convention is the prohibition against penalizing asylum
seekers based on the manner of their arrival to the country where they
are seeking protection.31 This Comment argues that the rescued
passengers of the Palapa met the definition of a refugee under the
Refugee Convention and its modifying Protocol, 32 and therefore they
were entitled to seek asylum in countries that have agreed to be
bound by its principles.
Still, compliance with the Refugee Convention alone is insufficient
if a country is party to additional treaties that protect the general
population. Other international agreements provide additional rights
to refugees and asylum seekers. For the inhabitants of Australia, the
ICCPR, the CRC, and OPCAT provide many essential rights,
including: the right to liberty and security of person; freedom from
arbitrary arrest or detention; freedom from torture, cruel, inhumane,
or degrading treatment; the right to equal protection under the law;
the right not to be expelled, returned or extradited to a country where
27. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 33.
28. Id. art. 16 (emphasis added).
29. Id. art. 26 (emphasis added).
30. When the Norwegian ambassador to Australia was permitted to board the
Tampa the refugees passed him a letter, addressed to the people of Australia,
appealing for asylum. MARR & WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 151–54 n.16.
31. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 31.
32. See supra note 25.
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the person would be in danger of being tortured; the right of children
to have their best interests considered by welfare institutions, courts
of law, or administrative authorities; the right of children to apply to
enter or leave a country for the purpose of family reunification; and
the right of children to express their own views in any judicial or
administrative proceedings.33
On December 10, 1948, the UN General Assembly ratified a
catalog of the ―inalienable rights of all members of the human
family‖ in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 34
Although the UDHR was conceived as a statement of objectives to be
pursued by all governments, the Declaration is not technically part of
legally binding international law, and there are no signatories.35 The
principles upheld by the Declaration, however, wield power in the
form of moral and diplomatic pressure on members of the
international community.36 Among the list of civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights entitled to all peoples is the right
to seek asylum from persecution.‖37 Australia spurned its obligations
under the UDHR when it failed to provide the Palapa refugees the
right to a legal avenue to petition for asylum.
III. EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE POWER
Australia‘s intolerant stance towards boat people reached a climax
in 2001 because of the politically sensitive timing of the Tampa
33. HUMAN RIGHTS REFUGEE LAW KIT, supra note 12. Canberra frustrated
efforts by the International Red Cross, who had assembled and transported a
civilian doctor, nurse, and translator team, to board the Tampa to address basic
humanitarian needs. MARR & WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 151.
34. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, para. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
35. Tai-Heng Cheng, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Sixty: Is it
Still Right for the United States?, 41 CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 251, 251–53 (2008).
36. See Nat‘l Coordinating Comm. for UDHR50, Questions and Answers about
the UDHR (1998), http://www.udhr.org/history/question.htm (―While the record
shows that most of those who adopted the UDHR did not imagine it to be a legally
binding document, the legal impact of the Universal Declaration has been much
greater than perhaps any of its framers had imagined.‖). In 1968, the United
Nations International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran met to review the
progress made in the twenty years since the adoption of Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights,
Teheran, Iran, April 22–May 13, 1968, Proclamation of Tehran, at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 32/41. They declared that the Declaration ―constitutes an obligation for the
members of the international community‖ to protect the rights of their citizens. Id.
37. ―Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution.‖ UDHR, supra note 34, art. 33.
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incident. It occurred during the run-up to the Liberal Party of
Australia‘s re-election campaign.38 The Howard government
launched a massive public relations campaign vilifying refugees who
arrive by boat as undeserving of admission into Australia. The
Liberal Party of Australia also stoked a growing public fear that
allowing unwanted refugees to access the country‘s legal immigration
scheme would overrun the system and disadvantage its citizenry
economically.39 Legally, the government invoked its executive power
under Australia‘s Commonwealth Constitution40 to justify the forcible
seizure of the Tampa as well as the removal and detention of the
refugees aboard.
Australia‘s seizure of the Tampa and prevention of boat people
from accessing Australian territory were challenged in Victorian
Council for Civil Liberties Inc. v. Minister for Immigration &
Multicultural Affairs.41 The Victorian Council for Civil Liberties, a
leading Australian human rights and civil liberties organization,
initially secured the refugees‘ release by filing a writ of habeas
corpus. Justice North ordered that ―the respondents release those
persons rescued at sea who were brought on board MV Tampa on or
about 26 August 2001 . . . and bring those persons ashore to a place
on the mainland of Australia.‖42
On appeal, Chief Justice Michael Eric John Black, Justice Bryan
Beaumont, and Justice Robert Shenton French of Australia‘s Federal
Court directly considered the issue of the federal government‘s
authority to seize the Tampa.43 The legitimacy of the seizure under
Australian law, as they framed the issue, involved two secondary
questions: (1) did the Commonwealth government have the authority
to seize the Tampa to prevent boat people from landing in Australia
38. MARR & WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 151 (―The Liberal poster in 2001
showed a resolute John Howard with his fists clenched, flanked by flags. The
message was: ‗WE DECIDE WHO COMES TO THIS COUNTRY AND THE
CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THEY COME’ . . . . Huge advertisements showing
the same determined Howard defending his country against invading boat people
appeared that morning in all the major newspapers of Australia.‖).
39. Widespread fear of illegal immigration was easily stoked, and often carried
racist overtones: ―Nascent racism, ancient fears of invasion by immigration and
talkback radio ranting against Asian crime were about to fuse into a new
extraordinarily potent political force.‖ Id. at 123.
40. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1974 (Austl.).
41. (2001) 182 A.L.R. 617 (Austl.).
42. Id. at 655.
43. Ruddock v. Vadarlis (2001) 183 A.L.R. 1, 6 (Austl.).

FOX MACRO - 05-11-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

INTERNATIONAL ASYLUM AND BOAT PEOPLE

5/27/2010 2:50 PM

365

in the absence of a federal statute granting such power, and (2) if the
authority existed, was it abolished and/or superseded by the country‘s
Migration Act?44
Ultimately, the Federal Court reversed the trial court decision and
denied the writ of habeas corpus, holding that the Migration Act had
neither extinguished nor limited the government‘s executive power.45
Central to the court‘s decision was the scope and capacity of the
Commonwealth‘s executive power.
Although Section 61 of the Commonwealth Constitution provides
that ―the executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the
Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General,‖ the scope of the
executive power is never expressly defined.46 Justices French and
Beaumont, writing for the majority, concluded that the executive
power was a separate concept from the old prerogative power.47 They
differentiated it and asserted the right to exclude aliens as a necessary
implication that can only be abrogated by ―clear [statutory] intent,‖
which was not made apparent by the Migration Act.48 Justice Black,
in his dissent, argued that any Commonwealth executive power was
limited to a defunct common law prerogative power,49 now
superseded by the Migration Act.50
Two positions can be taken to resolve the meaning of executive
44. Bradley Selway, All at Sea—Constitutional Assumptions and “The
Executive Power of the Commonwealth”, 31 FED. L. REV. 495, 496 (2003). Selway
argues that Australia‘s Commonwealth Constitution includes an inadequately
defined legal concept of executive power, and therefore the decision in Ruddock v.
Vadarlis rested on an assumption as to what considerations are relevant in
determining its scope and meaning. Id. at 506.
45. Ruddock, 183 A.L.R. at 27.
46. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1974, c. 2, § 61.
47. See infra note 49.
48. Ruddock, 183 A.L.R. at 49. The court asserted that ―[t]he executive power
of the Commonwealth under [Section] 61 cannot be treated as a species of the royal
prerogative . . . [w]hile the executive power may derive some of its content by
reference to the royal prerogative, it is a power conferred as part of a negotiated
federal compact expressed in a written Constitution distributing powers between
the three arms of government . . . .‖ Id.
49. Id. at 19 (Black, J., dissenting). The Prerogative Power, or the Royal
Prerogative, is the concept that various powers rest exclusively with the Crown,
such as the power to declare war or make treaties. TONY BLACKSHIELD & GEORGE
WILLIAMS, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY 261 (2006).
Prerogative powers were derived from common law, and can be superseded by
statute or lost over time from lack of use. Id.
50. Ruddock, 183 A.L.R. at 19 (Black, J., dissenting).
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power under Section 61 of the Australian Commonwealth
Constitution. First, the executive power may be understood in
comparison with its U.S. counterpart because Section 61 was derived
from Article II of the U.S. Constitution.51 Additionally, Australia
adopted a separation of powers model of government similar to that
of the U.S.52 Under the American model, the executive power of the
president is an implied power; it is the power necessary to execute the
laws and check the powers of the other branches of government. The
American governmental structure contains no lingering prerogative
powers of the British Crown that need to be considered when the
executive takes action, an intended consequence of the American
Revolution.53 Applied to Australia‘s Commonwealth Constitution,
this understanding justifies the holding in Ruddock v. Vadarlis and
frees the court from the need to investigate any prerogative powers
held at common law by ―constitutionalizing‖ an implied executive
power.54
A second, divergent understanding of the executive power under
Section 61 is through the lens of British and colonial history. The
basic constitutional structure of the British Empire was established by
the mid-nineteenth century with an ―Imperial Parliament‖ as
sovereign, the monarch acting on the advice of her UK ministers, and
each minister represented in each colony by a governor with
delegated authority.55 Therefore, at the time of federation, all
prerogative powers were ―Imperial prerogative powers‖ exercised by
the Queen unless they were abrogated by legislation.56 Under this
framework, the common law prerogative was intended to form part of
the executive power of the Commonwealth and cannot be separated
or ―constitutionalized‖ as previously suggested. Accordingly,
executive power would not enjoy immunity from judicial or
legislative restraint as embodied in the Migration Act. 57 Adopting this
interpretation of the nature of executive power could have altered the
majority‘s opinion.

51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (―The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.‖).
52. Selway, supra note 44, at 500.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 501.
56. Id. at 505–06.
57. Id. at 506.
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Following the federal court decision, the Australian Parliament
enacted the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers)
Act of 2001.58 This Act sought to retroactively validate any
government actions in relation to the Tampa affair and effectively
deny its passengers the right to claim asylum.59 Vadarlis‘ application
for special leave to appeal to the High Court was rejected on
November 27, 2001;60 by that time the Howard government had
transferred the refugees from temporary detention on the Tampa to
more permanent detention camps in third countries.
IV. THE PACIFIC SOLUTION
Australia‘s plans for dealing with an escalating number of boat
people attempting to enter their territory took shape in response to the
Tampa affair. On September 1, 2001, while the refugees lingered
outside Australian territorial waters on the Tampa for a seventh day,
Prime Minister John Howard held a press conference to announce a
resolution to the standoff:
Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr[.] Ruddock and I have called this
news conference this morning to announce that an agreement
has been reached so that all of the people on board the MV
Tampa can be processed in third countries, not in Australia or
in an Australian Territory, to have their claims for refugee
status determined and then dealt with under the normal
processes applying to refugees around the world.61
58. The Australian Minister of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Philip
Ruddock, MP, circulated an explanatory memorandum of the Border Protection
Bill in the House of Representatives that plainly stated the purpose of the Act: ―The
Bill seeks, for more abundant caution, to ensure that there is no doubt about the
Government‘s ability to order ships to leave Australia‘s territorial waters. Provision
is also made to avoid the possibility of legal action being taken in Australian courts
as a result of any action taken under the Act.‖ Memorandum from Philip Ruddock,
MP, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2001), http://www.austlii.
edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/legis/cth/bill_em/bpb2001212/memo1.html?query=borde
r%20protection%20act%202001.
59. BARRY YORK, DEP. OF THE AUSTL. PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY, AUSTRALIA
AND REFUGEES, 1901–2002 ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY BASED ON OFFICIAL
SOURCES: SUMMARY 54 (2003), http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/chron/200203/03chr02.htm. This specific Act was ultimately rejected in the Senate, but some
of its key provisions were introduced through various other measures. See infra
note 64.
60. Transcript of Refusal of Special Leave to Appeal, Vadarlis v. MIMA (High
Court of Australia, Gaudron, Gummow, and Hayne JJ., Nov. 27, 2001) (Austlii).
61. John Howard, Prime Minister of Australia, Joint Press Conference with the
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The government resolved to transfer the refugees from their vessel
to detention centers on small pacific islands for ―processing‖ rather
than admit them and evaluate their refugee status claims within the
ordinary Australian legal framework.
What came to be known as the Pacific Solution was accomplished
in three phases: (1) the excision of thousands of islands from
Australia‘s Migration Zone to prevent the granting of due process
rights under the Migration Act to boat people who physically reached
these locations; (2) the interception of vessels containing asylum
seekers by the Australian Defense Force under Operation Relex;62
and (3) the removal of persons to third countries for processing and
refugee status determinations.63
On September 26, 2001, the Australian Senate passed a series of
legislative enactments that formally launched the Pacific Solution.64
The six Acts aimed to secure Australia‘s borders and deter unlawful
arrivals of noncitizens. In addition to the Migration Zone changes, the
legislation dealt with the validation and enforcement of new border
protection measures, a new humanitarian and refugee visa regime,
new refugee assessment criteria, mandatory sentencing for human
traffickers, and a restrictive clause relating to judicial review of
migration decisions.65

Minister of Immigration the Hon. Philip Ruddock MP (Sept. 1, 2001), available at
http://www.sievx.com/articles/psdp/20010901HowardRuddockConf.html.
62. At a joint press conference with the Minister of Immigration Prime Minister
Howard stated, ―Commencing immediately the Australian Defence Force will
conduct enhanced surveillance, patrol and response operations in international
waters between the Indonesian archipelago and Australia. This will involve five
naval vessels and four P-3C Orion aircraft.‖ Id. The Prime Minister described
Operation Relex as an ―intensification‖ of existing practice designed to deter
people smuggling operations originating from Indonesia. Id. See also MARR &
WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 161.
63. Pursuant to the Migration Act, persons could henceforth be transferred at
sea to detention centers in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. Penelope Mathew, Legal
Issues Concerning Interception, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 221, 232–33 (2003).
64. York, supra note 59, at 54–55. The six Acts included the Migration
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001, the Migration Amendment
(Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001, the
Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001, the Migration
Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2001, the Migration Legislation Amendment
Act (No. 6) 2001, and Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act
2001. Id.
65. Id.
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A. Excision of Territory from the Migration Zone
The Australian government first excised Christmas Island, the
Ashmore and Cartier Islands, and the Cocos Islands from Australia‘s
Migration Zone.66 This action disqualified unlawfully arriving
noncitizens from applying for visas.67 The Migration Amendment
(Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act of
2001 further allowed for the detention of unlawful noncitizens in
excised offshore locations, the transfer of unlawful noncitizens from
Australia to a third country, and the preclusion of unlawful
noncitizens from taking legal action against the government in an
Australian court.68
B. Interdiction at Sea
Under phase two of the Pacific Solution, the Australian navy
physically intercepted and boarded the Tampa. In contrast to less
visible forms of interception, such as carrier sanctions, visa
procedures, or airport immigration inspection procedures that prevent
the arrival of asylum seekers, interdiction at sea is one of the most
far-reaching and spectacular forms of interception possible.69
UNCLOS divides the world‘s oceans into sectors of decreasing
levels of state jurisdiction as the distance from land increases.70 While
the territorial sea is akin to state territory, the zones beyond that area
allow for limited legislative jurisdiction and enforcement in regards
to immigration powers.71 Outside of the territorial sea, states may
exercise ―control‖ in the contiguous zone to punish or prevent
infringement of their immigration frontiers within the territorial sea.72
In the adjoining Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), UNCLOS does not
extend immigration law powers.73 Finally, on the High Seas, with
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Mathew, supra note 63, at 221–22.
70. UNCLOS, supra note 19, arts. 2–15, 33(2), 56, 57, 86. These demarcations
include the territorial sea (up to twelve nautical miles from the sea baseline), the
contiguous zone (up to twenty-four nautical miles from the sea baseline), the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (up to 200 nautical miles from the sea baseline)
and the High Seas (all areas beyond the zones in which states may exercise
sovereign power). Mathew, supra note 63, at 223.
71. Mathew, supra note 63, at 223–24.
72. UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 33.
73. Id. art. 56(1)(c) (granting to states only ―sovereign rights‖ over natural
resources).
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certain exceptions for piracy, jurisdiction of persons rests with the
vessel‘s flag state only.74
In a situation where a state seeks to combat the trafficking of
illegal migrants and has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel is
smuggling people by sea ―and is without nationality or may be
assimilated to a vessel without nationality,‖ the state may board and
search the vessel as long as it ―take[s] appropriate measures in
accordance with relevant domestic and international law.‖75 This is
particularly applicable during anti-human-trafficking operations.
However, Australia concerned itself with Indonesian vessels at this
time, not stateless vessels.76 Australia needed to secure Indonesia‘s
cooperation (the vessel‘s flag state) in order to interdict the Tampa on
the High Seas, but no agreement of this kind existed at the time of the
incident.77 Without Indonesia‘s prior consent, the interdiction
operation amounted to unlawful interference with the passengers‘
freedoms under international law.78
C. Evasion of the Refugee Convention
For Australia, circumventing the reach of the Refugee Convention
was the obvious advantage of an offshore interdiction policy. 79 The
Howard government understood the Refugee Convention‘s protective
provisions to be dependent upon an individual‘s entry into Australia‘s
physical borders.80 In fact, Article 33 offers no express language
concerning entry.81 Article 33 affirms that expulsion or refoulement
of refugees in ―any manner whatsoever‖ is prohibited in order to
protect refugees from being sent to countries that are not party to the
Refugee Convention and might not respect the principle of
nonrefoulement.82 If the nonrefoulement responsibility is understood
74. Id. art. 6.
75. Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants, supra note 15, art. 8(2).
76. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
77. Mathew, supra note 63, at 226–27.
78. A Humans Rights Watch study of Australia‘s Pacific Solution policies
indicated that Indonesia was merely notified when Australia began intercepting and
returning boats to Indonesia. Id. at 227–28 (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BY
INVITATION ONLY: AUSTRALIAN ASYLUM POLICY 45 (2002)). Australia apparently
relied on Indonesia not to assert its rights under international law, perhaps because
of the involvement of human traffickers. Mathew, supra note 63, at 228.
79. Mathew, supra note 63, at 228–29.
80. Id.
81. Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 33.
82. Mathew, supra note 63, at 229.
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as an obligation of conduct as well as result, then a country may be in
breach of the Refugee Convention if it fails to ensure that the
refugees it discharges will not be protected from refoulement
elsewhere in third countries.83 During the Tampa incident, Australia
adopted a position that entry into its territory was essential to the
reach of the Refugee Convention, but the practice of potential chainrefoulement that it engaged in may be a separate and independent
violation of international law.84
D. Indefinite Detention in Third Countries
Under phase three of the Pacific Solution, the Australian navy
transferred the refugees aboard the Tampa to the HMAS Manoora, a
Royal Australian Navy vessel. The refugees were transported by the
navy, processed, and housed in detention centers in Nauru and Papua
New Guinea.
A crucial question is whether detained persons may be transferred
to a third country without their consent. The UDHR affirms the right
of every human being to seek asylum,85 and the ICCPR grants the
right to liberty86 and the right to leave one‘s own country.87 Neither
general human rights treaties nor the Refugee Convention, however,
grant a person an exclusive right of entry or the right to be granted
asylum in a particular country.88 As a matter of international refugee
law, relocating asylum seekers intercepted at sea to third countries—
even without their consent—might be permissible as long as the
Refugee Convention‘s bar against refoulement has been met. 89
Australia took this posture as an issue of sovereign right.
Whether a right exists to choose the country of asylum is an issue
on which the Refugee Convention is also silent. Australia‘s actions,
however, raise good faith issues regarding the circumvention of
Article 31 of the Convention. This Article prohibits a state from
penalizing refugees ―on account of their illegal entry or presence‖ or
83. Id.
84. Id. But see Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993)
(holding that the interdiction of Haitian boat people on the High Seas was
permissible because neither the Refugee Convention nor the relevant U.S. statute
extended to persons outside U.S. territory).
85. UDHR, supra note 34, art. 14.
86. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 9.
87. Id. art. 12.
88. Mathew, supra note 63, at 234.
89. See Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 33.
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from applying ―to the movements of such refugees[‗] restrictions.‖90
Article 31 applies to persons present within state territory.91 Thus, if
the territorial sea where the Tampa was seized is assimilated to state
territory,92 then the refugees were arguably penalized in violation of
the Refugee Convention, and their freedom of movement unlawfully
restricted under international law. Alternatively, Australia might
argue that a transfer to a third country participating in its Pacific
Solution fulfilled the requirements of Article 31 and the right to seek
asylum protected under Article 14 of the UDHR93 because the
refugees were delivered to a safe haven. The reality, however, is that
the refugees were detained in Nauru or Papua New Guinea with their
final destinations left uncertain, and any hope for resettlement in a
third country was unclear. 94 At minimum, Pacific Solution
agreements with third countries did state that Australia would take
responsibility for any asylum seekers ultimately left unsettled.95
Even if the Refugee Convention does not expressly prohibit this
manner of open-ended, indefinite detention of asylum seekers, other
international human rights that supersede domestic legal decisions
may check a state policy of this kind. For example, there may be a
right of entry into a country in cases involving torture or family ties
considerations, or a right to humane conditions in the detention
facilities themselves.96 Finally, the right to individual liberty under
the UDHR appears particularly threatened. The detention of persons
until such time as the ―vagaries of international relations‖ dictate
their reception somewhere else is an unacceptable proposition.97
V. CONCLUSION
Australia‘s 2001 Howard government decided that the primary
function of its refugee policy was not to provide humanitarian
assistance and relieve the suffering of refugees fleeing far off wartorn countries but to protect its nation‘s borders against unwanted
migrants. No evident policy goal of deterring human rights violations
was apparent. Quite the reverse: Australia‘s ad hoc policy towards
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. art. 31.
UNCLOS, supra note 19, art. 31.
See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
UDHR, supra note 34.
Mathew, supra note 63, at 235.
Id.
Id. at 235–36.
Id. at 236 (citing Amuur v. France, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 533, para. 48 (1996)).
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arriving boat people, reflected in the handling of the Tampa affair and
the hastily prepared Pacific Solution, indicated a policy of national
self-interest above all other concerns and election politics pursued in
the name of sovereignty.98 More importantly, the Tampa proceedings
revealed a lack of justiciability of international norms in Australian
courts. The government‘s refusal to allow asylum seekers to access
its borders likely violated its international legal obligations to the
principle of nonrefoulement.
The future of international refugee protection depends upon a
reaffirmation of the Refugee Convention and efforts to address
restrictive interpretations placed on its principles by individual
states.99 Remaining gaps can be filled through the protections
provided to vulnerable refugees in additional international
agreements, such as the UDHR, ICCPR, CRC, and OPCAT. These
and other international conventions should be strengthened through
continued adherence to their standards and equally severe
condemnation and sanction of states that fail to meet their
obligations. The purpose of international law is to govern relations
between sovereign states and disallow individual national interests to
countermand obligations entered into with the international
community.
The story of Australia‘s experience with boat people is replete with
occurrences that fall short of good sense and civilized expectation in
the area of human rights and international refugee law. The Howard
government was unapologetic about its goals of deterring unwanted
boat people and the denial of access to domestic asylum rights. It
took six more years, but following the election of the Australian
Labor Party in 2007, the notorious Pacific Solution was quietly
abandoned.

98. See James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of
Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 129, 167–68 (1990) (arguing that the
responsibility for protecting refugees under the 1951 Convention was formally
placed in the hands of individual states, and not the UNHCR, thus allowing
―political and strategic interests to override humanitarian concerns in the
determination of refugee status . . . undercutting the university of the protection
mandate‖).
99. See Erika Feller, The Evolution of the International Refugee Protection
Regime, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 129 (2001).

